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“LIFT HIGH THE CROSS?”† 
CONTRASTING THE NEW EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CASES ON RELIGIOUS 
SYMBOLS ON GOVERNMENT PROPERTY 





This Article shows that the European Court of Human Rights case of Lautsi v. 
Italy, upholding the display of a crucifix in an Italian state school classroom, compares 
favorably to recent United States Supreme Court cases that have upheld the display of 
crosses and Decalogues on public property. Both the European Court and the Supreme 
Court now grant greater deference to longstanding public displays of religion, to local 
decision-making about which religious symbols to maintain, and to the social utility and 
value of having public displays of religion in a pluralistic democratic society. Moreover, 
they have come to hold that protection of religious freedom does not require the 
secularization of society, but protection against coerced participation in or support for 
religion. 
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Introduction 
A comparative anthropologist could not have asked for a better script: two high 
profile cases, one before the European Court of Human Rights, the other before the 
U.S. Supreme Court, each involving challenges to traditional displays of crosses on 
government property. The European high court struck down the cross. The American 
high court upheld the cross. Both cases are procedurally complicated and are factually 
distinguishable. But the juxtaposition of these decisions illustrates the growing contrast 
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in European and American attitudes toward traditional religious symbols on government 
land and toward religious freedom more generally. Europe, as the heartland of 
Christianity for nearly two millennia, seems to be moving towards ever-stronger policies 
of secularization and laïcité. America, once the champion of strict separation of church 
and state, seems to be moving toward an ever more generous accommodation of its 
religious traditions and symbols. 
In Lautsi v. Italy,1 a mother of two children who attended an Italian public school 
challenged an Italian tradition going back to 1924 that called for the display of a crucifix 
in each public school classroom.2 The perennial and prominent presence of these 
overtly Christian symbols, Lautsi argued, was contrary to the atheistic beliefs with which 
she wanted to raise and educate her children.3 She thus sought to have the crucifixes 
removed.4 She won her case in the Italian trial court.5 She lost before the Italian 
domestic courts, which declared that the cross was an integral part of Italy’s history, 
culture, and identity, and that the cross was itself a symbol of the nation’s distinct 
commitment to liberty, pluralism, and toleration of all peaceable faiths.6 Lautsi then 
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that Italy’s actions violated 
her and her children’s rights to education and to religious freedom guaranteed by the 
European Convention on Human Rights in Article 2 (of Protocol Number 1) and Article 
9.7 
On November 3, 2009, a unanimous seven-judge chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights held for Lautsi.8 The Court found that the public display of 
crucifixes in public school classrooms constituted a violation both of the right of parents 
to educate their children in conformity with their own convictions and of the right of 
children to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, which included the right to be 
free from coerced religious participation or observance.9 The Court ordered damages to 
Lautsi of €5000.10 Italy appealed, dismayed at what it took to be an assault on its 
national culture and tradition.11  
On June 30, 2010, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
heard further arguments in the case.12 At least twenty European nations  publicly stated 
 
 1 Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) [hereinafter Lautsi I], http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/Homepage_EN 
(follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Lautsi” in the “Case 
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The hearing was held on June 30, 2010, and eight of the ten intervening states were participating to 
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their support for Italy and joined its criticism of the European Court’s first chamber 
decision.13 The Lautsi case was taken under advisement by the Grand Chamber, which 
was subject to intense lobbying pressure on both sides.   
On March 18, 2011, just as this Article was going to final press, the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights reversed the Chamber below, and 
held 15-2 in favor of Italy, halting at least for now the steady march toward increasingly 
secularization and laïcité.14 While the pages that follow retain our analysis of the original 
Chamber judgment against the backdrop of earlier European Court cases, we reflect on 
the significance of the Grand Chamber’s judgment in the Conclusions of this Article, and 
show the growing convergence with recent United States Supreme Court case law. 
In Salazar v. Buono,15 a retired national park worker challenged the display of a 
cross in a national park in the State of California.16 The Veterans of Foreign Wars 
(“VFW”), a private group, had donated and erected the cross in 1934 as a memorial to 
fallen American soldiers.17 The cross stood alone, visible on the horizon.18 A small sign 
at the base of the cross indicated that the VFW had donated it.19 Buono brought suit 
claiming that the presence of the cross on government land constituted an 
establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.20 A 
federal district court found the cross display to be unconstitutional.21 Congress 
responded by conveying a small parcel of the federal land with and around the cross to 
the VFW, in exchange for a nearby private tract of land that was added to the national 
park.22 The district court declared this purported Constitutional cure a “sham,” and 
repeated its injunction that the cross be removed.23 The national park service appealed, 
ultimately to the Supreme Court.24 
A plurality of the Supreme Court ordered that the cross be retained.25 The 
decision to enjoin Congress’s land sale, Justice Kennedy wrote for the plurality, required 
the district court to undertake a separate Constitutional inquiry of whether Congress had 
violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause; it could not simply assume that 
this land sale was a “sham” designed to “evade” the first injunction.26 Congress had 
tried to resolve a “dilemma” created by the district court: “It could not maintain the cross 
 
 13 For a full list of these twenty states, see id. 
 14 See Grand Chamber Case of Lautsi and Others v. Italy (App. No. 30814/06), reported in  preliminary 
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 15 Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
 16 Id. at 1812. 
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without violating the injunction, but it could not remove the cross without conveying 
disrespect for those [dead soldiers] the cross was seen as honoring. Deeming neither 
alternative to be satisfactory,” Congress had instead sold the land and cross to a private 
party.27 The district court now would have to judge the Constitutionality of Congress’s 
actions on the merits.28 In Justice Kennedy’s view, the district court would have to take 
into account the reality that, while the cross was “certainly a Christian symbol,” it had 
been erected in the park not “to promote a Christian message” or to “set the imprimatur 
of the state on a particular creed. Rather, those who erected the cross intended simply 
to honor our Nation’s fallen soldiers.”29 The district court would further have to recognize 
that “[t]ime also has played its role” and that “the cross and the cause it commemorated 
had become entwined in the public consciousness” and part of “our national heritage.”30 
The contrasts in these cases are as ironic as they are striking. It is no small irony 
that Italy, a land saturated with Christian religious symbols, was ordered to remove its 
crosses, while California, famous for its Hollywood-style secularism and avant-garde 
culture, may keep a cross in place. It is no small irony that, after so many centuries of 
cultural adaptation and application, a cross in Italy was still judged to be an offensive 
religious symbol, while in America, after a few short decades, a memorial cross was 
judged to be so deeply woven into American “public consciousness” and “national 
heritage” that it could no longer be removed.31 And it is no small irony that the European 
Court, operating without an explicit prohibition on religious establishments, struck down 
the cross, while the U.S. Supreme Court, armed with an explicit Constitutional 
command that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,”32 
let the cross stand on land that Congress controlled. 
What is not so ironic or surprising is that the Lautsi court took this firm stand 
against the public display of a cross in a public school setting. Young and 
impressionable students, often compelled to be in school, are generally more vulnerable 
to religious pressure and coercion, and western courts have thus long been zealous in 
protecting them in the name of religious freedom. Indeed, in six decades of cases 
before Salazar, the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down the use of religious symbols in 
public schools, along with prayers, Bible reading, and religious instruction.33 A number 
of European nations besides Italy have done the same.34 This might suggest that, with 
Lautsi, European and American laws of religious freedom are actually moving closer 
together rather than further apart. And it might further suggest that the Lautsi case, 
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et al. eds., 2006) (discussing European education and religious liberty issues). 
despite its strong language of secularity and laïcité, may be restricted in its application 
to public schools, rather than becoming a step on the slippery slope toward the greater 
secularization of Europe that some critics fear. After all, despite the sweeping 
Constitutional logic of strict separation of church and state35 at work in many of its 
religion and public school cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has rarely used these cases 
as precedents to strike down overt religious expression, free exercise accommodations, 
and church-state cooperation in other areas of public life.36 Particularly in recent years, 
the Supreme Court, flush with neo-federalist energy, has shown ample deference to the 
actions of state and local officials concerning religion when those actions are challenged 
under the First Amendment Establishment Clause.37 The European Court of Human 
Rights might proceed similarly in limiting the reach of Lautsi to public schools—
particularly given its parallel doctrine to federalism of granting a “margin of appreciation” 
to national traditions and practices that are challenged as violations of the religious 
freedom guarantees of the European Convention on Human Rights.38 
The aim of this mini-symposium on “Religious Symbols on Government Property” 
is to probe these questions at greater depth. In the balance of this Article, the authors 
situate the Lautsi and Salazar cases in the existing case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court, respectively. The Lautsi case, it turns out, 
is largely one of first impression: most European Court cases on religious freedom and 
educational rights to date have dealt with private expressions of religious dress and 
ornamentation in public schools and other public settings.39 The Salazar case, by 
contrast, is the last in a three-decade series of convoluted Supreme Court cases.40 It 
seems to signal a retreat by the Court to its original position of allowing old religious 
symbols to stand on public lands, even while still preventing religious symbols in public 
schools.41 
In the two Articles that follow, two experts provide an in-depth analysis of the 
Lautsi and Salazar cases and the jurisprudential stakes at work in each case. Andrea 
Pin, a distinguished Constitutional law professor at the University of Padua, has 
watched the Lautsi case emerge from the very region of Italy where Pin had been 
schooled as a child and where he now teaches as a law professor. Pin provides a close 
and revealing analysis of the Constitutional history and cultural battles of Italy 
concerning religious freedom, the shifting relationship between the Catholic Church and 
the Italian state, and the unique understanding of Italian-style laicità (rather than 
French-style laïcité).42 Pin then contrasts the Italian Constitutional law of religious 
symbolism with the emerging jurisprudence of religious freedom of the European Court 
 
 35 See John Witte, Jr., Facts and Fictions About the History of Separation of Church and State, 48 J. 
CHURCH & ST. 15, 15–46 (2006). 
 36 Id. 
 37 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 33, at 186. 
 38 See HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 13 (1996); GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 80 (2007). 
 39 See infra text accompanying notes 128–56. 
 40 See infra text accompanying note 387–89. 
 41 See infra text accompanying notes 411–23. 
 42 See Pin, supra note 6, at 116–41. [Need to update pg. # during flips] 
of Human Rights.43 Pin regards Lautsi as a serious test case that marks the growing 
tension between Italy and Europe, between religious traditions and secular modernity, 
between a commodious Constitutional concordance of religion and state and the 
emerging right of a secularist to veto these carefully calibrated national arrangements in 
the name of European religious freedom.44 In the end, Pin thinks the original Chamber 
decision of Lautsi is wrong, and the crosses should remain.  He thus applauds the 
recent Grand Chamber judgment.45  
Adam Linkner, a bright new Constitutional scholar now clerking with a 
distinguished federal judge, has followed the Salazar case from the beginning. He takes 
note of the conflicting lower federal court treatment of the very issue on which the 
Salazar plurality divided—whether a sale of government property that contains 
offending religious symbols is permissible under the First Amendment Establishment 
Clause.46 The real difficulty with Salazar, he argues, is that the Supreme Court gave too 
little guidance to the district court on remand to determine the Constitutionality of 
Congress’s land sale.47 Linkner thus cleverly distills the convoluted six decades of 
Supreme Court approaches to the Establishment Clause into a more workable and 
predictable “insider/outsider” test that he astutely discerns at work even in the multiple 
opinions in Salazar.48 First, this test requires a court to judge whether the “predominant 
purpose” or intent of the government was to favor, endorse, or privilege religion.49 This 
is an “insider” inquiry that considers all the evidence of what went into the government’s 
decision and action respecting religion.50 Second, the test requires a court to judge 
whether an external reasonable observer would see the primary effect of the 
government’s action as one that endorsed religion.51 This is an “outsider” inquiry, one 
that views the result of the government’s action in context and determines whether it 
mostly supports, favors, or privileges religion over non-religion.52 These are separate 
inquiries, Linkner insists; a government action respecting religion should be struck down 
if either its predominant purpose or its principal effect is to favor religion.53 In Linkner’s 
view, Congress’s land sale was so transparently favorable to religion that it fails the 
insider/outsider inquiry.54 In the end, Linkner thinks Salazar is wrong and the cross 
should come down.  He would likely applaud the recent case of Jewish War Veterans v. 
City of San Diego, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, distinguishing Salazar, 
ordered the removal of a large cross, privately donated nearly a century ago but now 
owned by the federal government – the Ninth Circuit’s concern being, that from an 
outsider’s perspective, the primary effect of the cross was to endorse religion.55 
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 53 See id. at 125–27. [Need to update pg. # during flips] 
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 55 See id. passim.  See Steve Trunk and Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America v.  City 
of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011).  
Together, these two Articles illustrate some of the complexity of the legal issues 
surrounding the place of religious symbols on government land, and how serious 
scholars and judges can take opposing views and marshal reasoned arguments for 
each of them. It is easy to be cynical about these cases—treating them as much ado 
about nothing, or expensive hobbyhorses for cultural killjoys and public interest litigants 
to ride. But that view underestimates the extraordinary luxury we now enjoy in the West 
to be able to fight our cultural contests over religious symbols in courts and academies, 
rather than on the streets and battlefields. In centuries past in the West, and in many 
regions of the world still today, disputes over religious symbols often lead to violence, 
sometimes to all-out warfare.56 For religious and cultural symbols often embrace and 
evoke deep personal and communal emotions. Think of what happens when someone 
attacks or defaces an icon, a flag, the grave of a loved one, or the memorial of a fallen 
hero. Far more is thus at stake in these cross cases than the fate of a couple of pieces 
of wood nailed together. These cases are essential forums in which to work through our 
deep cultural differences and to sort out peaceably which traditions and practices 
should continue and which should change. 
 Religious Freedom and Religious Symbols in the European Convention and the 
European Court of Human Rights 
Lautsi is largely a case of first impression, though it draws on several lines of 
cases. In this Part, we review the basic provisions on point in the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the procedures used by the European Court of Human Rights in 
adjudicating claims arising under the Convention. Wereview the relevant cases on 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and on the rights to education and free 
expression. At the end of each Subpart below, we briefly sort through how these 
precedents can be marshaled to support both sides of the Lautsi case now before the 
Grand Chamber. 
Provisions and Procedures 
A major instrument of the Council of Europe, the 1950 European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR” or “Convention”) is binding upon all forty-seven of the current 
member states.57 The European Court of Human Rights (“Court” or “European Court”), 
reformed in 1998,58 is the principal interpreter of the Convention.59 It is a daily operating 
and fully functioning supervisory body, staffed with forty-seven judges, representing 
 
 56 See RENE GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED (1977) Samuel Azariah, The Violence of 
Religious Intolerance, WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, http://www.wcc-
coe.org/wcc/what/jpc/echoes/echoes-18-06.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
 57 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 46, opened for 
signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights] (entered 
into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
 58 See generally Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, opened for signature 
May 11, 1994, E.T.S. 155 [hereinafter Protocol 11] (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998) (amending the 
European Convention on Human Rights). 
 59 Id. art. 19. 
each member state, along with some 640 clerks.60 The Court’s principal task is to hear 
cases that determine whether the member states are violating the rights guaranteed in 
the Convention.61 Since 1998, any party under the jurisdiction of a European member 
state has standing to claim a violation of rights under the Convention and file a claim 
directly with the Court.62 However, the Court has frequently stated that it is not a court of 
last appeal that can supplant national judicial remedies.63 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights is the major provision on 
religious freedom.64 It guarantees that: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.65 
The European Court has made clear that religious freedom “entails, inter alia, freedom 
to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise a religion.”66 It 
has also made clear that Article 9(2) of the ECHR is an exhaustive list of the grounds on 
which any government official may impose limitations on religious freedom.67 
Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention supplements the religious 
freedom guarantee of Article 9 in cases of education.68 Article 2 provides: “No person 
shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes 
in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to 
ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions.”69 Article 14 of the Convention further prohibits discrimination 
 
 60 See Role of the Registry, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/ 
The+Court/How+the+Court+works/The+Registry (last visited Mar. 20, 2011). 
 61 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE COURT IN BRIEF (2010), available at http:// 
www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF074FE4-96C2-4384-BFF6-
404AAF5BC585/0/Brochure_en_bref_EN.pdf.  
 62 Id. 
 63 See NINA-LOUISA AROLD, THE LEGAL CULTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 31 (2007) 
(analyzing the Court’s general workings and relationships with member states). 
 64 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 57, art. 9. 
 65 Id. art. 9. 
 66 Buscarini v. San Marino, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 605, 616.  
 67 DAVID J. HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE & COLIN WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 435 (2d ed. 2009); THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
768 (Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006). 
 68 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, 
opened for signature Mar. 3, 1952, E.T.S. 009 [hereinafter Protocol 1] (entered into force May 18, 1954). 
 69 Id. 
on grounds of religion.70 And Article 10 protects freedom of expression, which can 
include religious and anti-religious expression.71 
Religious freedom cases arising under Article 9 are relatively few compared to 
other areas of human rights.72 From 1959 to 2009, the European Court of Human Rights 
(and its predecessors) found a total of thirty violations of this Article,73 five of them 
occurring in 2009 alone.74 By comparison, during that same forty-year period, the Court 
found some 4008 violations of Article 6 concerning the fairness and length of 
proceedings,75 and the Court has close to 140,000 pending applications.76 While 
religious freedom cases are small in number, violations of Article 9 are still burning 
issues,77 keeping Europe’s judges busy and probably giving them headaches. 
By repeatedly finding violations by individual member states, the European Court 
has induced changes in many domestic legal systems of member states. Those 
changes have prompted a growing awareness of other possible human rights claims; 
that fact, together with an increase in the number of member states, has resulted in a 
flood of applications to the Court.78 To manage this swollen docket, Protocol 14 now 
gives judges the discretion to restrict themselves to cases alleging “significant” 
violations.79 Chambers of seven judges, selected from among the forty-seven sitting 
 
 70 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 57, art. 14 (“The enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status.”). 
 71 Id. art. 10(1) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers.”). 
 72 See Nina-Louisa Arold, Promoting Normative Cracks in the Surface: Strasbourg Changing Swedish 
Legal Culture, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: NORDIC PERSPECTIVES 275, 278 (Lisbet 
Christoffersen et al. eds., 2010).  
 73 PUB. RELATIONS UNIT, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 50 YEARS OF ACTIVITY: THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS—SOME FACTS AND FIGURES 15 (2010) [hereinafter 50 YEARS OF ACTIVITY], 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ACD46A0F-615A-48B9-89D6-8480AFCC29FD/0/ 
FactsAndFiguresENAvril2010.pdf. 
 74 PUB. RELATIONS UNIT, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, VIOLATION BY ARTICLE AND BY COUNTRY 2 
(2009), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/E8F73EC8-AF6A-4205-BAF2-
F6043F67F651/0/Tableau_de_violations_2009_ENG.pdf. 
 75 50 YEARS OF ACTIVITY, supra note 73, at 15 (noting 4008 cases that concerned length of proceedings 
and an additional 3207 cases that concerned the right to a fair and timely trial, hence a total of 8007 
cases under Article 6 of the ECHR between 1959 and 2009).  
 76 See PUB. RELATIONS UNIT, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PENDING APPLICATIONS ALLOCATED 
TO A JUDICIAL FORMATION (2010), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/99F89D38-902E-4725-
9D3D-4A8BB74A7401/0/Pending_applications_chart.pdf (in December 2010, there were 139,650 
pending applications). 
 77 See generally Brett G. Scharffs, Symposium Introduction: The Freedom of Religion and Belief 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Legal, Moral, Political and Religions  
Perspectives, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 249 (2010). 
 78 But see PUB. RELATIONS UNIT, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, STATISTICS 2010 (2010), 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/8699082A-A7B9-47E2-893F-
5685A72B78FB/0/Statistics_ 
2010.pdf (discussing that between 1959 and 2009, the Court delivered a total of 12,198 judgments, while 
between January and September 2010, it produced 1442 judgments and 24,321 admissibility decisions). 
 79 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 57, art. 35 (“The Court shall declare 
inadmissible any individual application . . . if it considers that: . . . (b) the applicant has not suffered a 
significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols 
thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be 
rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.”). 
judges, decide most cases.80 These seven judges often are a balanced representation 
of the legal cultures represented among the forty-seven member states.81 
Within three months of a chamber judgment any of the parties can request a 
referral to a Grand Chamber.82 This constitutes an internal appellate review, and 
involves seventeen judges of the European Court.83 The Italian government in Lautsi 
invoked this mechanism.84 While, politically, the banning of Christian crucifixes in Italian 
schools might come as a surprise, both the hybrid legal culture of the European Court of 
Human Rights85 and the Court’s prior cases can readily support this decision, even if not 
ineluctably; hence, the Grand Chamber review in this case. To protect national 
traditions, or issues of special sensitivity in national societies, the Court frequently 
invokes the doctrine of a margin of appreciation.86 That doctrine recognizes that national 
judges are often better placed than international judges to assess these culturally 
sensitive questions.87 Only if there is a manifest breach of the European Convention on 
Human Rights will the Court find a violation.88 
When a party claims a violation of Article 9 rights to religious freedom, the Court 
will assess: (1) whether there is interference with that right; (2) whether this interference 
was based on law; and (3) whether this interference was necessary in a democratic 
society.89 It is usually the third step, the balancing test by the Court, which is the focus 
of most cases. There the judges analyze whether the interference corresponds to a 
pressing social need, is proportionate to the aim pursued, and is justified by relevant 
and sufficient reasons.90 
Religious beliefs and traditions can be relevant in making these decisions, even if 
they are not directly raised in an Article 9 case. A good example is the European Court 
case of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria91 regarding an act of state censorship that was 
challenged as a violation of Article 10 rights to free expression.92 The case concerned 
the seizure and ban of a movie ridiculing the Holy Family that was slated to be shown at 
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an art institute in Tyrol, Austria.93 Using the margin of appreciation doctrine, the 
European Court judges found these state restrictions on the film to be justified.94 The 
Court determined that the national authorities of Austria were better able to discern the 
cultural trends and moral sensitivities of the Tyrol region of Austria.95 While the Court 
recognized that Article 10 rights to freedom of expression encouraged a pluralism of 
religious and non-religious beliefs, these values had to yield in this case to the state’s 
concern about ideas that would strongly offend and attack the religious beliefs of a 
traditionally Catholic region that cherished the Holy Family.96 Here, the margin of 
appreciation doctrine was used to defer to a national court’s protection of local Christian 
sensibilities and traditions.97 This is an important precedent for Italy in the Lautsi case—
though Otto-Preminger-Institut is an Article 10 case dealing with freedom of expression, 
not an Article 9 case dealing with freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 
Manifestations of Belief: What Gets Article 9 Protection? 
The display of a belief through symbols combines concerns both about “religion” 
and “manifestation” of religion under Article 9. The European Court interprets “religion” 
broadly, but when it comes to “manifestation” not every action driven by religious belief 
is recognized and/or protected under Article 9. Three cases illustrate the range of 
treatment by the Court. In Pretty v. United Kingdom,98 the European Court held that a 
husband’s act of assisting the suicide of his terminally-ill wife was not a religious 
manifestation or act protected under Article 9, even if done on grounds of humanity and 
dignity.99 The husband could not accordingly claim a religious freedom exemption from 
English criminal prohibitions on assisting suicide.100 In Cha’are Shalom Ve Tzedek v. 
France,101 the Court found that while Jewish ritual slaughtering in general was a 
religious manifestation or practice deserving presumptive protection under Article 9, a 
state prohibition on a certain form of ritual slaughtering, deemed cruel to animals, was 
justified under Article 9, especially since an alternative supply of kosher meat was 
available from a neighboring state.102 In Kokkinakis v. Greece,103 the Court found that 
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The fundamental nature of the rights guaranteed in Article 9 para. 1 (art. 9-1) is also reflected 
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reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are 
respected. 
 
proselytism or evangelization was a religious manifestation protected by Article 9, and 
that the state was not justified in imposing criminal sanctions on a peaceable 
proselytizer.104 
In a subsequent case of proselytism, Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. 
Russia,105 the Court restated how vital freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is 
for the democratic society: 
[A]s enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one 
of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the 
Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that 
go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is 
also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. 
The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly 
won over the centuries, depends on it. While religious freedom is primarily a 
matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom to “manifest 
[one’s] religion” alone and in private or in community with others, in public and 
within the circle of those whose faith one shares. Since religious communities 
traditionally exist in the form of organised structures, Article 9 must be 
interpreted in the light of Article 11 of the Convention, which safeguards 
associative life against unjustified State interference. Seen in that 
perspective, the right of believers to freedom of religion, which includes the 
right to manifest one’s religion in community with others, encompasses the 
expectation that believers will be allowed to associate freely, without arbitrary 
State intervention. Indeed, the autonomous existence of religious 
communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is thus 
an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords. The State’s 
duty of neutrality and impartiality, as defined in the Court’s case-law, is 
incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of 
religious beliefs.106 
None of these cases dealt directly with whether a professed secularist has the 
right to be free from observing a government’s display of religious symbols in a public 
school. But these cases do make clear that religious freedom for all—even for atheists 
and agnostics—is a cherished right in a democratic society, and states must have 
strong and stated reasons and proportionate methods to regulate or limit this right. 
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Religious and Non-Religious School Curricula 
Two recent school cases come closer to the issues of Lautsi. In Folgerø v. 
Norway107 and Grzelak v. Poland,108 the Court dealt with forms of religious instruction in 
public schools that were challenged by professed atheists and agnostics.109 Folgerø 
concerned Norway’s new law that required all public grade school and middle school 
students to take a course in “Christianity, Religion and Philosophy” (“KRL”).110 The law 
made no full exemption for non-Christian students.111 A student, whose parents were 
professed atheists, objected that this curricular requirement violated the rights to 
education guaranteed by Article 2.112 The European Court agreed.113 It found that the 
state had not tailored its new law carefully enough to deal with students with different 
religious and non-religious sensibilities:114  
[N]otwithstanding the many laudable legislative purposes stated in connection 
with the introduction of the KRL subject in the ordinary primary and lower 
secondary schools, it does not appear that the respondent State took 
sufficient care that information and knowledge included in the curriculum be 
conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner for the purposes of 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. Accordingly, the Court finds that the refusal to 
grant the applicant parents full exemption from the KRL subject for their 
children gave rise to a violation of Article 2.115 
Three years later, in Grzelak, a public grade school student in Poland, with 
agnostic parents, was properly exempted from mandatory religion classes in 
accordance with Folgerø.116 But the student’s only alternative to attending the religion 
classes was to spend unsupervised time in the school hallway, library, or club.117 His 
parents wanted him enrolled in an alternative course in secular ethics.118 The school 
refused to offer such a special course, on grounds of having insufficient teachers, 
students, and funds.119 The school further marked the student’s report card with a blank 
for “religion/ethics,” and calculated his cumulative grade point average based on fewer 
credit hours.120 The Court found both these state actions to be in violation of both Article 
9 and Article 14 of the Convention, for “[it] brings about a situation in which individuals 
are obliged—directly or indirectly—to reveal that they are non-believers. This is all the 
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more important when such obligation occurs in the context of the provision of an 
important public service such as education.”121 
The Court considers that the absence of a mark for “religion/ethics” would be 
understood by any reasonable person as an indication that [this student] did 
not follow religious education classes, which were widely available, and that 
he was thus likely to be regarded as a person without religious beliefs. . . . 
and distinguishes the persons concerned from those who have a mark for the 
subject. This finding takes on particular significance in respect of a country 
like Poland where the great majority of the population owe allegiance to one 
particular religion. . . . [T]he Court finds that the absence of a mark for 
“religion/ethics” on the [student’s] school certificates throughout the entire 
period of his schooling amounted to a form of unwarranted stigmatisation . . . 
.122 
These cases come closer to Lautsi in that they deal with state impositions of 
religion on public school students—directly in the case of Folgerø, indirectly in the case 
of Grzelak. Neither is a straightforward Article 9 case. Folgerø is about Article 2 rights to 
education free from religious influence;123 Grzelak combines Article 9 with Article 14 
restrictions on religious discrimination.124 Nonetheless, the Court stretched far in both 
these cases to protect the religious freedom rights of atheistic and agnostic public 
school students and their parents.125 And it included within the right of religious freedom 
(and related rights of education and non-discrimination) the right of a person to be free 
from state impositions of religion and even from indirect costs that come from avoiding 
the state’s religious offerings.126 Lautsi is still distinguishable: it is not about active 
curricular instruction in religion, but the passive display of a crucifix that the student will 
encounter in many other walks of Italian public and private life as well.127 But these 
cases are important precedents for Lautsi and her children. 
School Dress Codes and Headscarves 
In three other cases, the Court dealt with direct Article 9 religious freedom claims 
by Muslim women to wear headscarves in manifestation of their religion but contrary to 
public school dress codes.128 In each case, the Court held for the state, holding that the 
state’s interest in protecting the “secularity” of the school in a democratic society was a 
sufficient ground to justify its prohibitions on headscarves.129 In each case, the Court 
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granted a margin of appreciation to the state to decide this culturally sensitive issue of 
headscarf regulations in accordance with its own traditions of secularism.130 
In Dahlab v. Switzerland,131 a state elementary school teacher, newly converted 
to the Islamic faith from Catholicism, was banned from wearing a headscarf when she 
taught her classes.132 The government highlighted the value of maintaining secularism 
in a public school that was open to young students from various traditions.133 Invoking 
the margin of appreciation doctrine, the Court found this school dress code and its 
application to Dahlab to be necessary and proportionate, and dismissed her claim that 
the state had violated her freedom of thought, conscience, and religion under Article 
9.134 The Court stressed 
that it is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful external symbol 
such as the wearing of a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience 
and religion of very young children. The applicant’s pupils were aged between 
four and eight, an age at which children wonder about many things and are 
also more easily influenced than older pupils. In those circumstances, it 
cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some 
kind of proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by 
a precept which is laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court 
noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It therefore 
appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the 
message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-
discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their 
pupils. 
Accordingly, weighing the right of a teacher to manifest her religion against 
the need to protect pupils by preserving religious harmony, the Court 
considers that, in the circumstances of the case and having regard, above all, 
to the tender age of the children for whom the applicant was responsible as a 
representative of the State, the Geneva authorities did not exceed their 
margin of appreciation and that the measure they took was therefore not 
unreasonable.135 
In Dogru v. France,136 a Muslim girl refused to follow her public school’s dress 
code that required her to take off her headscarf during physical education classes and 
sports events.137 Dismayed by the breach of its rules and the tensions it caused among 
the other students, the school initiated disciplinary actions against her.138 When she 
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persisted in her claim to wear her headscarf in all public settings, the school offered to 
teach her through a correspondence program, an option that her parents rejected.139 
She was then expelled from the school.140 After losing in the French courts, she claimed 
violations of her Article 2 and Article 9 rights under the Convention.141 The European 
Court again held for the state, and again accorded France an ample margin of 
appreciation for its policy of maintaining a secular ethic in its public schools.142 
Where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are 
at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ 
widely, the role of the national decision-making body must be given special 
importance. This will notably be the case when it comes to regulating the 
wearing of religious symbols in educational institutions, in respect of which 
the approaches taken in Europe are diverse. Rules in this sphere will 
consequently vary from one country to another according to national traditions 
and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others and to maintain public order.143 
In the most famous headscarf case, Şahin v. Turkey,144 an Islamic medical 
student at Istanbul University was forbidden to take certain courses and exams because 
she was wearing a headscarf contrary to state rules governing dress.145 The University 
brought disciplinary actions against her.146 After losing in the Turkish courts, she filed a 
claim before the European Court of Human Rights alleging a violation of her Article 9 
rights.147 The Court held for Turkey, and again granted a margin of appreciation to the 
Turkish constitutional and cultural ideals of gender equality and state secularism.148 
The principle of secularism was inspired by developments in Ottoman society 
in the period between the nineteenth century and the proclamation of the 
Republic. The idea of creating a modern public society in which equality was 
guaranteed to all citizens without distinction on grounds of religion, 
denomination or sex had already been mooted in the Ottoman debates of the 
nineteenth century. Significant advances in women’s rights were made during 
this period (equality of treatment in education, the introduction of a ban on 
polygamy in 1914, the transfer of jurisdiction in matrimonial cases to the 
secular courts that had been established in the nineteenth century). 
The defining feature of the Republican ideal was the presence of women in 
public life and their active participation in society. Consequently, the ideas 
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that women should be freed from religious constraints and that society should 
be modernised had a common origin.149 
The Court further noted that Turkish national law clearly bans veils and 
headscarves from schools and public workplaces, and these bans had been upheld 
many times by the Turkish Constitutional Court.150 The European Court then discussed 
the different practices of European states concerning religious symbols and 
headscarves in order to assess whether there was a common European standard on 
the issue that could be enforced uniformly.151 There was none.152 Only Turkey, 
Azerbaijan, and Armenia at the time had explicit regulations concerning Islamic 
headscarves in a university.153 France, “where secularism is regarded as one of the 
cornerstones of republican values,” prohibits persons from wearing headscarves, 
yarmulkes, and oversized crosses in its state schools.154 In seven other countries, 
including Germany and the United Kingdom, Muslim public school and university 
students were allowed to wear headscarves.155 
In the absence of a clear European consensus on the regulation of headscarves, 
the European Court was left to build on its own case law about how much religious 
freedom to protect and how much national regulation of religion to respect. Those 
precedents, the Şahin court concluded, called for an ample margin of appreciation to 
local practices, which the Court granted to Turkey: 
In democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and the 
same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the 
various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected. . . . 
Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a “democratic 
society.” Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to 
those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a 
majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the 
fair and proper treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a 
dominant position. Pluralism and democracy must also be based on dialogue 
and a spirit of compromise necessarily entailing various concessions on the 
part of individuals or groups of individuals which are justified in order to 
maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society. Where 
these “rights and freedoms” are themselves among those guaranteed by the 
Convention or its Protocols, it must be accepted that the need to protect them 
may lead States to restrict other rights or freedoms likewise set forth in the 
Convention. It is precisely this constant search for a balance between the 
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fundamental rights of each individual which constitutes the foundation of a 
“democratic society[.]” 
Where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are 
at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ 
widely, the role of the national decision-making body must be given special 
importance. This will notably be the case when it comes to regulating the 
wearing of religious symbols in educational institutions, especially . . . in view 
of the diversity of the approaches taken by national authorities on the issue. It 
is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the 
significance of religion in society . . . and the meaning or impact of the public 
expression of a religious belief will differ according to time and context. Rules 
in this sphere will consequently vary from one country to another according to 
national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order. Accordingly, the 
choice of the extent and form such regulations should take must inevitably be 
left up to a point to the State concerned, as it will depend on the specific 
domestic context.156 
In the “specific domestic context” of Turkey, “secularism” is “one of the 
fundamental principles of the Turkish state.”157 This principle is “in harmony with the rule 
of law and respect for human rights [and] may be considered necessary to protect the 
democratic system in Turkey.”158 Religious “attitudes” and actions to the contrary “will 
not enjoy the protection of Article 9 of the Convention.”159 Hence by a sixteen to one 
vote, the Grand Chamber found in favor of Turkey.160 
Only Judge Tulkens dissented, arguing that the majority was using the margin of 
appreciation doctrine to abdicate its responsibility to protect fundamental rights.161 The 
vital issues of religious freedom at stake in this case are not merely “a ‘local’ issue,” she 
argued, “but one of importance to all the member States. European [Court] supervision 
cannot, therefore, be escaped simply by invoking the margin of appreciation.”162 
On what grounds was the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of 
religion through the ban on wearing the headscarf based? In the present 
case, relying exclusively on the reasons cited by the national authorities and 
courts, the majority put forward, in general and abstract terms, two main 
arguments: secularism and equality. While I fully and totally subscribe to each 
of these principles, I disagree with the manner in which they were applied 
here and to the way they were interpreted in relation to the practice of 
wearing the headscarf. In a democratic society, I believe that it is necessary 
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to seek to harmonise the principles of secularism, equality and liberty, not to 
weigh one against the other.163 
While these three cases do not treat the government’s own use of religious 
symbols, they are nonetheless important precedents for both sides of the Lautsi case. 
These cases can be used to support Lautsi’s claim to religious freedom and non-
discrimination for herself and her children. The only way they can enjoy true “equality” 
and “liberty” in Italy as a religious minority, the argument goes, is for the state to 
embrace the principle of “secularism” and to remove those symbols and end those 
practices that privilege and reflect the dominant Catholic faith. Particularly in the context 
of a state school, where children are learning the fundamentals of democracy and 
freedom for all, even the passive display of a symbol that is overtly Christian and 
perennially present in the classroom violates the mandates of secularism. 
Secularism, the argument continues, is the only common feature that binds 
together the potpourri of European traditions—Catholic Italy, Ireland, and Poland, 
Protestant Sweden and Norway, Anglican England, Muslim Turkey, Orthodox Greece 
and Romania, and the large number of atheists in former Socialist countries.164 In 
accepting the European Convention on Human Rights,165 these countries are also 
accepting the principle of secularism embedded within it. The only way to ensure that 
each member state abides by its commitment to human rights, and to the principles of 
secularity and neutrality that human rights demand, is to ban religious symbols on 
government land, particularly in public schools—whether those symbols are put there by 
the state or brought there by a private party. Especially a “powerful external symbol” like 
the headscarf, as the Dahlab Court noted, can be understood as a threat to “the 
message of tolerance, respect for others, and above all, equality and non-
discrimination.”166 It is best to ban all these religious symbols in public life. Combine the 
solicitude for the religious freedom claims of atheists and agnostics in Folgerø and 
Grzelak167 against state imposition of religion with the clarion call for state secularism in 
Şahin, Dogru, and Dahlab,168 the argument concludes, and Lautsi and her children 
should win. 
The real issue, Italy might counter, is whether the European Court is sincere 
about granting a margin of appreciation to national tribunals on culturally “sensitive” 
issues in which no “European consensus” exists.169 Or is the Court simply using the 
margin of appreciation doctrine as a pretext to establishing secularism throughout 
Europe, even in countries like Italy that reject it. Europe, after all, has no consensus 
about the mandates of secularism, and nothing in the European Convention commands 
secularism as a condition for respecting the human rights of all,170 whatever the Court’s 
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imaginings to the contrary. Moreover, Europe has no consensus about the propriety of 
religious symbols on government land or in government buildings. These are highly 
sensitive local issues in ancient religious cultures like Italy that are gradually moving on 
their own terms and their own timetable toward ever greater pluralism. 
Moreover, why would the European Court reject strong Article 9 claims by 
sincere good faith Muslims, engaged in mainstream religious practices that run contrary 
to new national policies of secularism, yet grant Article 9 claims of a secularist who has 
only recently emigrated to Italy with her children but now objects to the vestiges of 
ancient traditions of Christianity? Why should young students—controlled by secularist 
parents—get full religious freedom protection against even indirect forms of majoritarian 
religion, while sincere, good faith Muslim adults cannot get the religious freedom to 
wear unobtrusive headscarves while enjoying their rights to education? The European 
Court has painted itself into a secularist corner, the argument for Italy would conclude, 
forgetting the true meaning of religious freedom. 
Freedom of Expression 
In Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, the European Court used the margin of 
appreciation doctrine to defer to Austria’s traditions of Christianity, even in the face of a 
strong Article 10 claim to freedom of expression to show an offensive anti-religious 
film.171 That case used the margin of appreciation doctrine in a way favorable to Italy’s 
argument in Lautsi. 
Another Article 10 case, Vajnai v. Hungary,172 can also be seen as helpful to 
Italy. A politician of a left wing party, during a public demonstration in Hungary, wore a 
five-pointed red star, the infamous symbol of the Communist era.173 He was convicted 
for wearing a totalitarian symbol in public.174 He filed a claim in the European Court, 
claiming a violation of his Article 10 rights to freedom of expression.175 The Court held in 
the politician’s favor.176 The Court took special note of Hungary’s history after its political 
transformation:  
[A]lmost two decades have elapsed from Hungary’s transition to pluralism 
and the country has proved to be a stable democracy. . . . It has become a 
Member State of the European Union, after its full integration into the value 
system of the Council of Europe and the Convention. Moreover, there is no 
evidence to suggest that there is a real and present danger of any political 
movement or party restoring the Communist dictatorship. The Government 
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has not shown the existence of such a threat prior to the enactment of the 
ban in question.177 
Not only was the blanket ban unjustified, it was also too broad, because it 
required no proof that the defendant identified with the ideas that the star represented: 
The ban can encompass activities and ideas which clearly belong to those 
protected by Article 10, and there is no satisfactory way to sever the different 
meanings of the incriminated symbol. Indeed, the relevant Hungarian law 
does not attempt to do so. Moreover, even if such distinctions had existed, 
uncertainties might have arisen entailing a chilling effect on freedom of 
expression and self-censorship.178 
While the Court recognized the deep scar that Communism had left on Hungary, 
the judges held that there was no longer a sufficient social need to criminalize the star 
that symbolized the former Communist regime.179 
[T]he applicant’s conviction for the mere fact that he had worn a red star 
cannot be considered to have responded to a “pressing social need.” 
Furthermore, the measure with which his conduct was sanctioned, although 
relatively light, belongs to the criminal law sphere, entailing the most serious 
consequences. The Court does not consider that the sanction was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. It follows that the interference 
with the applicant’s freedom of expression cannot be justified under Article 10 
§ 2 of the Convention.180 
While the scope and standard of Article 9 and Article 10 of the Convention are 
certainly different, the Vajnai case has some modest bearing on the Lautsi case. In 
favor of Italy, the case recognizes that once offensive symbols in public life can lose 
their sting over time, and become accepted parts of a pluralistic culture that is teeming 
with countervailing symbols of all sorts.181 Only two decades after the fall of 
Communism, the signature red star of the Communist regime was now deemed an 
acceptable part of public life, even if the star reminded many observers of prior 
oppression and political abuse, and even if the star was worn by a political official.182 
Wearing the star may be in bad taste, but the issue for the Vajnai court was whether 
wearing the star represented “a real and present danger” of a return to Communism, 
which it clearly did not.183 Italy can make a comparable argument respecting its 
crucifixes, and how passage of time has rendered them acceptable parts of a pluralistic 
culture. These crucifixes are not harbingers of a return to Catholic establishments, nor 
do they signal a “real and present danger” that the democracy of Italy is about to fall to 
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Catholic rule. Moreover, the offenses with which the crucifixes may have been 
associated in prior centuries of crusades, pogroms, and inquisitions have long since 
ended184—much longer than the offenses associated with the Communist red star, 
which many Hungarian citizens today can still remember. While the crucifixes may 
offend a few members of society, like Lautsi and her children, they represent cherished 
cultural values to many millions of others. Lautsi’s views, in fact, cause offense to 
millions of members of Italian society, but those views cannot be censored for that 
reason alone. Freedom of expression requires that all views be heard in public life, and 
no one should enjoy a heckler’s veto. 
The counterargument for Lautsi might be that “freedom of expression” is a right 
that the individual can claim against the state, not that the state can claim against the 
individual. The further counterargument might be that these crucifixes are not one of 
sundry symbols in public life, but are a distinctive part of the public school classroom 
which the state compels children to attend. And this case is about freedom of 
expression, not freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 
As the foregoing survey of cases illustrates, the Grand Chamber in the Lautsi 
case has a wide range of arguments at its disposal.  Interestingly, as we will note in the 
Conclusion, the Grand Chamber did rather little to distinguish these precedents, or even 
to deal with them in a serious way.  That will leave plenty of room for argument in 
subsequent European Court cases on religious symbols in public life, which are will 
doubtless arise in different quarters of Europe.   
 
 Religious Freedom and Religious Symbols in the U.S. Supreme Court185 
While the U.S. Supreme Court has operated continuously since 1790,186 its 
cases on religious symbols in public life and on government land have come only in the 
last thirty years.187 All these cases have arisen under the First Amendment 
Establishment Clause which, as noted in the Introduction, provides that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”188 That Constitutional provision, 
ratified in 1791,189 was largely a dead letter for the first 150 years of American history.190 
Before 1947, the Supreme Court heard only two cases directly under the Establishment 
Clause, holding for the government each time.191 This changed dramatically in 1947, 
when the Court decided the famous case of Everson v. Board of Education.192 Everson 
for the first time applied the Establishment Clause to state and local governments, by 
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incorporating it into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.193 Everson 
also declared that “the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to 
erect ‘a wall of separation between church and state.’”194 This opened the floodgates of 
litigation; since 1947, the Supreme Court has heard nearly seventy cases arising in 
whole or in part under the Establishment Clause.195 
Some two-thirds of these Establishment Clause cases have concerned 
education—more particularly, the place of religion in public schools and the place of 
government in religious schools.196 Particularly in its religion and public school cases, 
the Court issued its strongest statements that the Establishment Clause called for a 
“high and impregnable” wall between church and state.197 “That wall must be kept high 
and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.”198 The Court used this 
strict separationist logic to ban the use of religious teachers, religious officials, Bible 
readings, student-led prayers, moments of silence, and creationist science from the 
public school classroom, and to ban prayers and religious ceremonies even from 
occasional public school events like graduation ceremonies and football games.199 In 
these cases, the Court also developed a three-part test to apply the First Amendment 
Establishment Clause.200 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,201 the Court declared that any 
government action challenged under the Establishment Clause would meet 
Constitutional muster only if it: (1) had a secular purpose; (2) had a primary effect that 
neither advanced nor inhibited religion; and (3) fostered no excessive entanglement 
between church and state officials.202 This Lemon test, as it came to be called, was to 
be used not only in religion and education cases, but in all cases arising under the 
Establishment Clause.203 
Among the remaining Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases outside of 
education was a set of convoluted cases from 1980 to 2010 that raised two loaded 
questions: (1) what role may religious officials, ceremonies, and symbols play in public 
life; and (2) to what extent may government recognize, support, fund, house, or 
participate in these forms and forums of religious expression? 
Cases raising these questions had poured into the lower federal courts shortly 
after the Supreme Court issued its Everson case. Litigation groups like the American 
Civil Liberties Union, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and the 
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Anti-Defamation League filed many of the lawsuits.204 Their efforts were complemented, 
if not catalyzed, by the nation’s growing countercultural movements in the 1960s (think 
of the hippie movement, Woodstock, and the Vietnam War protests),205 by a growing 
anti-religious sentiment in the American academy in the 1970s (think of the “God is 
dead” movement and the Marxist critiques of religion),206 and by the rise of religious and 
cultural minorities whose views found too little place in majoritarian policies and 
practices.207 Cultural critics and Constitutional litigants challenged a number of 
admixtures of religion and government—including the presence of religious language, 
art, and symbols on government stationery and seals and in public parks and 
government buildings; the purchase and display of religious art, music, literature, and 
statuary in state museums; governmental recognition of Christian Sundays and 
holidays; and others.208 
Before 1980, few of these cases made much headway in the lower federal 
courts.209 The Supreme Court repeatedly refused to hear these cases on appeal, save a 
small cluster of cases in 1961 challenging traditional Sabbath day laws, which got 
nowhere.210 After 1980, however, the Court took on several cases on state-supported 
displays of religious symbols.211 These cases divided (and continue to divide) the Court 
deeply, yielding wildly discordant approaches to the Establishment Clause and bitter 
dissenting opinions from several of the Justices, notably Justices Scalia, Souter, and 
Stevens.212 
Religious Symbols in Public Schools 
Stone v. Graham was the Supreme Court’s first case to deal directly with the 
Constitutionality of religious symbols on government property.213 This was, in fact, 
another religion and public school case.214 The Stone Court struck down a state statute 
that authorized posting a plaque bearing the Ten Commandments (or Decalogue) on 
the wall of each public school classroom.215 Private groups in the community donated 
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and hung the plaques.216 The Commandments were not read publicly, nor did teachers 
or school officials mention or endorse them.217 Each plaque also bore a small inscription 
that sought to immunize it from charges of religious establishment: “‘The secular 
application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the 
fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United 
States.’”218 
Using the Lemon test, the Court struck down these displays as violations of the 
Establishment Clause.219 Its per curiam opinion held that the statute mandating the 
Decalogue display had no “secular legislative purpose” but was instead “plainly 
religious.”220 The Ten Commandments are sacred in Jewish and Christian circles, the 
Court reasoned, and they command “the religious duties of believers.”221 It made no 
Constitutional difference that the Ten Commandments were passively displayed rather 
than formally read aloud or that they were privately donated rather than purchased with 
state money.222 The very display of the Decalogue in the public school classroom 
served only a religious purpose and was thus per se unconstitutional.223 
Religious Crèches and Government Support 
The next main case dealt with the place of a government-sponsored religious 
symbol on private land, and here the Court upheld the display.224 In Lynch v. 
Donnelly,225 the Court addressed the Constitutionality of a government display of a 
crèche, or manger scene.226 For forty years, officials in the town of Pawtucket, Rhode 
Island coordinated with local merchants to put up a large Christmas display in a private 
park in the heart of the downtown shopping area.227 The display had many typical 
holiday decorations: stuffed animals, toys, striped poles, a Santa Claus house, a sleigh 
and reindeer, cardboard carolers, colored lights, a “Season’s Greetings” sign, and 
more.228 Embedded in this large display was a manger scene that depicted the Bible’s 
account of Christ’s birth.229 It included figurines of Mary, Joseph, and baby Jesus in a 
manger, surrounded by animals, shepherds, wise men, and angels.230 The crèche 
occupied about ten percent of the total holiday display space, and constituted fifteen 
percent of all the figurines.231 The city purchased the crèche forty years before and had 
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since stored and maintained it at little cost.232 Local taxpayers challenged the display as 
violating the Establishment Clause.233 
The Lynch Court upheld the display.234 “There is an unbroken history of official 
acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in American 
life,” Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority, giving an ample list of illustrations to 
show how crèches and other religious symbols had long been embedded in American 
culture and experience.235 But there is another reason to uphold this display, Burger 
continued, now working through the three-part Lemon test.236 Crèches, while of 
undoubted religious significance to Christians, are merely “passive” parts of “purely 
secular displays extant at Christmas,” and they have taken on secular civic purposes 
and become embedded in the fabric of society.237 Government acknowledgments of 
religion—like these crèches, legislative prayers, and the “In God We Trust” statements 
on our coins—are not per se unconstitutional, Justice O’Connor added in 
concurrence.238 Instead, they serve “the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing 
public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition 
of what is worthy of appreciation in society.”239 The primary effect of displaying the 
crèche as part of the broader holiday display is not to advance the Christian religion, 
Chief Justice Burger continued, but to “engender[] a friendly community spirit of good 
will” that “brings people into the central city, and serves commercial interests and 
benefits merchants.”240 Governmental participation in and support of such “‘ceremonial 
deism’” is not a form of excessive entanglement with religion and cannot be assessed 
“mechanically” or by using “absolutist” tests of establishment.241 “It is far too late in the 
day to impose a crabbed reading of the Establishment Clause on the country.”242 
Five years later, in Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter,243 the Court offered a much closer, if not “crabbed,” reading of the 
Establishment Clause to outlaw another public holiday display that ran for six weeks, 
from Thanksgiving Day, late in November, into the new year.244 This display was in the 
county courthouse near the “Grand Staircase,” a heavily trafficked area for the many 
people who used the county’s offices for licensing, registration, litigation, and the like.245 
Almost the entire display was a crèche, featuring the same biblical figurines displayed in 
Lynch.246 The tallest figurine was an angel holding a trumpet that bore a clearly visible 
sign: “Gloria in Excelsis Deo” (“Give Glory to God in the Highest”), the Latin words of a 
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familiar Christmas carol.247 A lay Catholic group donated the crèche and put up a small 
sign indicating the same.248 The county had put around the display a small white fence, 
flanked by two small pine trees with red bows, and lined with red and white 
poinsettias.249 For the three weeks before Christmas, the county had invited local high 
school choirs to sing carols at the crèche during lunch, dedicating the musical offerings 
to world peace and missing soldiers.250 Local taxpayers sued.251 
The Allegheny Court struck down this crèche display as violating the 
Establishment Clause.252 Justice Blackmun wrote for the plurality, noting that this 
display was on a prominent piece of government land, not in a private park like the 
Lynch display.253 This display was almost exclusively religious in content and not 
buffered by ample secular accoutrements of comparable size and genre.254 And this 
display carried a single, undiluted verbal message—enjoining viewers to give glory to 
God in the highest.255 Taken together, Justice Blackmun concluded, these factors had 
the fatal effect of primarily advancing or endorsing the Christian religion to the exclusion 
of all other faiths.256 
The same Allegheny Court, however, upheld the public display of a menorah, the 
eight-armed candleholder symbolizing the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah.257 The menorah 
in question was an abstract eighteen-foot design, privately owned but erected and 
maintained by the county.258 It was displayed at a lesser-used entrance to the same 
courthouse, alongside the city’s forty-five-foot decorated Christmas tree, which was 
labeled “A Salute to Liberty.”259 Given its less prominent placement on government land, 
its abstract design, its proximity to the larger “Salute to Liberty” tree, its lack of verbal 
religious messages, and its use of a symbol (a menorah) that has both religious and 
cultural connotations, this display was Constitutionally acceptable, Justice Blackmun 
concluded.260 The Court did not address the dissonance between upholding a menorah 
while simultaneously outlawing a crèche at the same courthouse, but seemed to 
suggest that each case turned on the context and the characterization of the religious 
symbol.261 
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Private Displays of Religious Symbols in Public Forums 
How to characterize a religious symbol arose again six years later, in Capitol 
Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette.262 For more than a century, Ohio kept 
open a ten-acre square around the state capitol building for public gatherings and 
displays of various sorts.263 Parties who wished to use the square had to apply and 
receive a free license from the state.264 In December, the state invited the community to 
erect various unattended displays in this square.265 The state put up its own Christmas 
tree, and granted a local rabbi’s application to put up a menorah.266 But the state denied 
the Ku Klux Klan’s (“KKK”) application to put up its signature Latin cross.267 The KKK 
appealed, charging the state with viewpoint discrimination in violation of its free speech 
rights.268 The state countered that allowing the KKK to display its cross next to the state 
capitol would be establishing religion.269 
The Pinette Court upheld the free speech rights of the KKK and found no 
Establishment Clause violation.270 “[A] free-speech clause without religion would be 
Hamlet without the prince,” Justice Scalia wrote for the plurality.271 The state created an 
open public forum in its Capitol Square, and it cannot discriminatorily exclude religious 
speech from this forum unless it has a compelling reason.272 The Court concluded that a 
general aspiration to avoid an establishment of religion was not a sufficiently compelling 
reason to justify religious discrimination.273 Moreover, the Latin cross was only a private 
expression of religion, and no reasonable person would assume that the state had 
erected or condoned it—especially since the KKK would prominently label the cross as 
its own.274 And, unlike the single crèche display at the grand staircase in Allegheny, this 
display would be one of several in a public forum open to anyone who applies.275 
Justice Thomas concurred, arguing not only that the Latin cross was a form of 
private expression, but also that it was not religious expression.276 For the KKK, “[t]he 
erection of such a cross is a political act, not a Christian one.”277 Its depiction is deeply 
offensive given the nation’s history of slavery and the KKK’s history of racism.278 But 
even offensive speech deserves free speech protection.279 
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Decalogue Displays on Government Land 
The Court’s conflicting messages and methods of dealing with public displays of 
religion became even more confusing after its two cases on the Constitutionality of Ten 
Commandments displays on government land. In McCreary County v. American Civil 
Liberties Union of Kentucky280 and Van Orden v. Perry,281 announced back-to-back on 
the same day, two sharply divided courts struck down one Decalogue display282 but left 
another standing.283 In McCreary County, Justice Souter, writing for the majority, used a 
strict Lemon analysis to strike down the display, with Stone v. Graham as the strongest 
precedent.284 In Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, ignored 
Lemon and instead used a soft-history argument to uphold the display, with Lynch v. 
Donnelly as the strongest precedent.285 Both cases featured long and bitter dissents by 
Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia respectively286 and cacophonies of concurring and 
dissenting opinions by other Justices.287 The practical difference in outcome on the 
Court was attributable to Justice Breyer, who joined the majority in McCreary County288 
and joined in the decision (but not the plurality opinion) in Van Orden. 289 In his 
concurrence in Van Orden, Justice Breyer described it as a “difficult borderline case” 
that called for “the exercise of legal judgment.”290 
McCreary County concerned a Kentucky county’s new display of the Ten 
Commandments on a prominent courthouse wall.291 Initially the county ordered the 
Decalogue to be hung by itself.292 When the ACLU sued, the county ordered that the 
Decalogue be retained but that other governmental documents be put around the 
display.293 The county’s new order stated that “‘the Ten Commandments are codified in 
Kentucky’s civil and criminal laws’”; that they were put up “‘in remembrance and honor 
of Jesus Christ, the Prince of Ethics’”; and that the “‘Founding Father[s] [had an] explicit 
understanding of the duty of elected officials to publicly acknowledge God as the source 
of America’s strength and direction.’”294 Almost all the surrounding governmental 
documents chosen for the display had the religious language in them highlighted.295 
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As the case proceeded through the courts, the county ordered a third display, 
without repealing its prior two orders.296 Now the Decalogue on display was expanded 
to include the full verses from Exodus 20, and not just a summary as in the prior 
exhibits.297 Nine other documents of comparable size flanked it, including the Magna 
Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the Mayflower Compact, 
and in these documents, more neutral language was highlighted.298 The collection as a 
whole was entitled “The Foundations of American Law and Government Display.”299 
Each document had a comparably-sized description of its historical and legal 
significance.300 The Ten Commandments bore this description: 
The Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced the formation of 
Western legal thought and the formation of our country. That influence is 
clearly seen in the Declaration of Independence, which declared that “We 
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” The Ten 
Commandments provide the moral background of the Declaration of 
Independence and the foundation of our legal tradition.301 
The entire display was on the wall of a heavily trafficked hallway in the county 
courthouse.302 The county had initiated and paid for the displays.303 
The McCreary County Court struck down this display as a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.304 Its fatal feature, in the Court’s judgment, was the lack of a 
genuine secular purpose, which both Lemon and Stone required.305 The Decalogue is a 
“pervasively religious text” with a clear religious message, Justice Souter wrote for the 
majority, even if this text may have had legal or political uses in the past.306 The 
county’s stated legislative purpose in putting up the display was to honor “‘Christ, the 
Prince of Ethics.’”307 The original text viewed in its entirety is an unmistakably religious 
statement dealing with religious obligations and with morality subject to religious 
sanction. “When the government initiates an effort to place this statement alone in 
public view, a religious object is unmistakable.”308 That was fatal in Stone, and it must 
be fatal here.309 
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The county’s clumsy attempts to dilute this religious message by relabeling the 
Decalogue as a moral code, and displaying other political documents with their religious 
passages prominently highlighted, only compounded its Constitutional error in the eyes 
of any “reasonable observer,” Justice Souter continued.310 The purported secular 
purposes of the county’s final display “were presented only as a litigating position”311 
and did little to offset the offending religious purpose that had informed the first two 
displays and the county’s actions throughout the lawsuit.312 A genuine attempt by 
government to cure an inadvertent unconstitutional condition could certainly pass 
muster under the Establishment Clause, the McCreary County Court concluded, but no 
such genuine attempt existed here.313 Viewed as a whole, and over time, the county’s 
actions formed an establishment of religion.314 
In Van Orden v. Perry, issued two hours after McCreary County, the Court took a 
very different approach.315 This case concerned a six-foot stone monument of the 
Decalogue on the state capitol grounds in Austin, Texas.316 A voluntary civic group, the 
Fraternal Order of Eagles, privately donated the Decalogue forty years earlier.317 It was 
one of thirty-eight historical markers and monuments on a twenty-two-acre state capitol 
campus.318 It was located near a lesser sidewalk that connected the state capitol with 
the state Supreme Court building.319 Van Orden, a state taxpayer who had regularly 
used the law library the prior six years, challenged the Decalogue display as a form of 
religious establishment.320 
The Van Orden Court upheld the display.321 “Our cases, Januslike, point in two 
directions,” Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote candidly for the plurality.322 One set of cases 
“looks toward the strong role played by religion and religious traditions throughout our 
Nation’s history.”323 “The other face looks toward the principle that governmental 
intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious freedom.”324 The Van 
Orden Court followed the first line of cases, and declared the Lemon test “not useful”325 
in this case. The Decalogue is clearly a religious text with a religious message, the 
Court made clear.326 But “[s]imply having religious content or promoting a message 
consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.”327 
The Decalogue, like many other religious texts and symbols on federal, state, and local 
government lands, is also part of “America’s heritage” part of the fabric of American 
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society.328 Its public display on government land democratically recognizes and 
represents that “‘religion has been closely identified with our history and government’” 
and that Americans are “‘a religious people, whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being.’”329 Moreover, this Decalogue display was privately donated.330 It stood 
unchallenged for forty years.331 It is a merely “passive” display that anyone can easily 
avoid while walking the state capitol grounds.332 And its message is buffered by the 
thirty-seven other monuments and markers on the same government land, most of 
which are decidedly secular.333 If this display is unconstitutional, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote, then hundreds of others religious displays and maybe even the 
religious statutes of Moses and Mohammed on a frieze in the Supreme Court building, 
must come down.334 That surely is neither the intent nor the import of the First 
Amendment Establishment Clause.335 
After such a remarkably discordant pair of cases, it was surprising to most 
observers that, four years later, the Supreme Court, in Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum,336 was unanimous in upholding the Constitutionality of a Ten 
Commandments monument on government land.337 The same Fraternal Order of 
Eagles in Van Orden had privately donated the monument forty years earlier.338 It was 
one of a dozen old signs and markers in a city park in Utah.339 A new religious group, 
called Summum, sought permission to erect in the park a monument with their Seven 
Aphorisms of faith.340 The city refused, so Summum sued under the First 
Amendment.341 It charged the city with violating the Free Speech clause by 
discriminating against its Seven Aphorisms.342 It also threatened to charge the city with 
violating the Establishment Clause by displaying the Ten Commandments alone.343 This 
left the city with a hard choice: take down the Ten Commandments or put up the Seven 
Aphorisms.344 
The Pleasant Grove City Court accepted neither approach, and held for the 
government.345 The Court treated the Ten Commandments monument as a form of 
permissible government speech.346 A government “‘is entitled to say what it wishes,’” 
Justice Alito wrote for the Court, and it may select and reflect certain views in favor of 
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others.347 A government may express its views by putting up its own tax-paid 
monuments or by accepting monuments donated by private parties (whose contents it 
need not fully endorse).348 In this case, city officials had earlier accepted a Ten 
Commandments monument on grounds that it reflected the “[a]esthetics, history, and 
local culture” of the city.349 The Free Speech Clause does not give a private citizen a 
“‘heckler’s veto’”350 over that old decision by the city. Nor does it compel the city to 
accept every privately donated monument once it has accepted the first.351 Government 
speech is simply “not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause,” the Court 
concluded, nor to judicial second-guessing under the First Amendment.352 Government 
officials are “‘accountable to the electorate’” for their speech, and they will be voted out 
of office if their views cause offense.353 
It helped the Pleasant Grove City Court that there were a dozen monuments in 
the city park, only one of which was religious in content.354 It also helped that the 
Decalogue in question was a forty-year-old monument that had never been challenged 
before.355 Such facts allowed some of the Justices to agree that the display did not 
constitute an establishment of religion.356 But the case turned on a characterization of 
the Ten Commandments monument as a form of government speech—not as a 
secularized icon of ceremonial deism or as a religious symbol sufficiently buffered by 
secular equivalents.357 The Pleasant Grove City Court did not deny or dilute the 
religious qualities of the Ten Commandments.358 Instead, it left it to elected government 
officials to decide how to reflect and represent the views of the people, including their 
religious views.359 The Court also left it to the people to debate and decide whether the 
government’s representation of their views was adequate or outmoded.360 Courts could 
certainly step in if the government coerced citizens to accept the religious views on 
these symbols, or if the government’s speech violated privacy, endangered society, or 
violated the Constitution.361 However, a merely passive display of a generic religious 
symbol or text was not nearly enough to trigger federal judicial intervention.362 
The Cross in the National Park 
The Supreme Court did not use this government-speech logic in Salazar v. 
Buono.363 The case, as discussed in the Introduction, concerned a challenge to a 
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seven-foot cross on prominent display in the Mojave National Preserve in California.364 
The cross had been donated and erected in 1934 by a private group, the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, as a memorial to fallen American soldiers.365 The cross stood alone.366 A 
few years earlier, a Buddhist group had sought to place one of its shrines near the 
cross, but the government had denied their application.367 A former park worker now 
challenged its Constitutionality.368 
Observers had expected the Salazar Court to return to Pleasant Grove City, and 
decide whether this privately-donated cross in a federal park, like the privately donated 
Decalogue in a city park, would be viewed as a Constitutionally permissible form of 
government speech.369 Unlike Pleasant Grove City, there were no nearby secular 
buffers to offset the religious message, but here the cross was a non-verbal symbol, its 
location was much more remote, and it had stood almost twice as long without 
challenge.370 The six fractured opinions in Salazar, however, focused largely on 
Buono’s standing rights, the Constitutionality of Congress’s private land sale, and the 
district court’s authority to enjoin it.371 
Writing for himself and two other Justices, Justice Kennedy concluded that 
Buono had standing both to press his original case that challenged the Constitutionality 
of the cross display on federal land and to press his subsequent case that challenged 
the federal land sale.372 But Kennedy was not convinced that the district court had 
jurisdiction to extend its original injunction against the cross to enjoin the congressional 
act authorizing the land sale.373 The decision to enjoin the land sale required a separate 
Constitutional inquiry whether Congress had truly violated the Establishment Clause, 
not just a simple judgment that its act was a “sham” designed to “evade” the first 
injunction.374 The district court would now have to judge Congress’s actions on the 
merits.375 In making this judgment, Kennedy continued, the district court would have to 
take into account the reality that while the cross was “certainly a Christian symbol,” it 
had not been erected in the park “to promote a Christian message” or to “set the 
imprimatur of the state on a particular creed. Rather, those who erected the cross 
intended simply to honor our Nation’s fallen soldiers.”376 The district court would further 
have to recognize that “[t]ime also has played its role” and “the cross and the cause it 
commemorated had become entwined in the public consciousness” and part of “our 
national heritage.”377 Justice Kennedy thus reversed the order enjoining the land 
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transfer and remanded the case to the district court to judge the Constitutionality of 
Congress’s act on the merits and in light of these factors.378 
Joining the plurality opinion, Justice Alito thought the case was sufficiently 
developed for the Supreme Court itself to make that Constitutional judgment—and in 
favor of the government.379 The cross had been privately donated to honor the nation’s 
war dead (just like crosses in government cemeteries everywhere), it had stood without 
challenge for seventy years, and it was an utterly remote corner of a desert park “seen 
by more rattlesnakes than humans.”380 Also joining the plurality opinion, Justices Scalia 
and Thomas thought that Buono lacked standing to seek an injunction of the land sale 
and the district court lacked power to issue the injunction.381 Buono is asking a federal 
court to prevent the display of a small cross on private land, they concluded; this leaves 
no Constitutional question to resolve.382 
That characterization missed the Constitutional point, Justice Stevens wrote in 
dissent, joined by three other Justices.383 The issue is whether the original display of the 
cross violates the Establishment Clause, and whether Congress’s actions in response 
to the district court order can be seen as an evasion—much like the government’s 
actions in the McCreary County case, which had been judged unconstitutional.384 
Justice Stevens concluded that both the purpose and effect of the land transfer statute 
was to endorse religion in violation of the establishment clause.385 In a separate dissent, 
Justice Breyer concluded that the district court did have power to enjoin the land 
transfer, making unnecessary any further inquiry into Establishment Clause issues.386 
Rules of Thumb in Future Religious Symbolism Cases 
This thirty-year line of religious symbolism cases—from Stone v. Graham387 to 
Salazar v. Buono388—has easily been the least steady of the Court’s Establishment 
Clause cases. Many of these cases turn heavily on the facts, and how these facts are 
characterized. Many feature widely discordant opinions, sometimes cast in rhetorically 
bombastic terms. The Court still seems a long way from creating a new concordance of 
its discordant precedents—though Adam Linkner’s article hereafter makes a valiant 
effort to find coherence among the jumbled opinions. So far, there are only a few rules 
of thumb to guide litigants and lower courts in these matters. Four are worth mentioning 
here—with the caveat that while each might be useful, none is dispositive. 
First, older religious displays and practices tend to fare better than newer 
displays, particularly if they have not faced much prior Constitutional challenge. Even if 
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the original inspiration for the old display or practice was religious, its longstanding 
presence in public life seems to imbue it with a kind of cultural and Constitutional 
imprimatur. In the Court’s view, it has become a part of American culture, society, and 
democracy—and is thus unlikely to be a fateful first step toward an establishment of 
religion.389 Sometimes the Court has implied that even if the display or practice once 
had specific religious meaning, that meaning has now been lost; and the display is now 
either merely a civic symbol devoid of religious content or a more generic symbol that 
evinces “ceremonial deism.”390 Other times, the Court has worked harder to 
acknowledge the ongoing religious nature and content of the symbol for many 
citizens.391 
Moreover, if Establishment Clause litigants sit on their rights too long, those 
rights tend to receive less deference when they are finally exercised. Older religious 
displays and practices were at issue in Lynch, Van Orden, Pleasant Grove City, and 
Buono, and the government won each time.392 Newer displays were at issue in Stone, 
Allegheny, and McCreary County, and the government lost each time.393  
The law recognizes both the power and the pressure of time in other areas. For 
example, the power of time can be seen in historical preservation and zoning rules that 
“grandfather” various older (religious) uses of property that do not comport with current 
preferred uses.394 It can also be seen in private property laws of “adverse possession”: 
an open, continuous, and notorious use of a property eventually will vest in the user.395 
Those legal ideas have some bearing on these religious symbolism cases, leaving older 
displays more secure but new displays more vulnerable. The law further recognizes the 
pressure of time in its rules of pleading and procedure. In order to promote finality and 
to prevent stale claims, legislatures set statutes of limitations on many claims.396 But the 
law itself has long done the same through the equitable doctrine of “laches,” which 
similarly penalizes parties for sitting too long on their rights.397 While the law does not 
set statutes of limitations on Constitutional cases, and the Court has never explicitly 
invoked laches, the idea itself seems to influence the Court. “If a thing has been 
practiced for two hundred years by common consent”—especially at the local level, 
Justice Holmes once wrote—“it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment 
to affect it.”398 
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Second, it can be critical to a case how the symbol or practice is labeled or 
characterized. Stone and McCreary County characterized the Decalogue as a religious 
symbol and struck it down;399 Van Orden and Pleasant Grove City characterized it as an 
historical marker and let it stand.400 Lynch labeled the crèche a mere holiday display 
with commercial value, and let it stand;401 Allegheny labeled the crèche a depiction of 
the Christmas story, and struck it down.402 Pinette called the Latin cross a form of 
private expression protected by the free speech clause;403 Pleasant Grove City called 
the Decalogue a form of government speech immune from the Free Speech Clause.404 
Lynch labeled the secular decorations around the crèche an effective buffer;405 
McCreary County regarded the secular documents around the Decalogue as fraudulent 
camouflage.406 For Stone, labeling the Decalogue as a moral code was viewed as a 
subterfuge belied by the very imperative tone of the Commandments.407 For Allegheny, 
labeling a forty-five-foot county Christmas tree as “a salute to liberty” was sufficient 
Constitutional cover for placement of a menorah.408 Allegheny treated as 
Constitutionally fatal two signs at the crèche bearing the imperative “Gloria in Excelsis 
Deo” and “Donated by the Holy Name Society.”409 Van Orden thought a small sign 
reading, “Presented . . . by the Fraternal Order of Eagles” offset any Constitutional 
offense to a six-foot Decalogue with imperatives like, “Thou shalt have no other gods 
before me,” “Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain,” and “Remember 
the Sabbath day, to keep it holy.”410 Characterization of the symbol or practice can be 
key to its Constitutional fate. 
Third, geographical location can also be important. Government-sponsored 
displays on private property, as in Lynch,411 get more deference than private displays on 
government property, as in Stone and Allegheny.412 Displays in prominent places on 
government properties, like the grand staircase in Allegheny413 or the main hallway in 
the McCreary County courthouse,414 are more suspect than those in less conspicuous 
places, like the secondary entrance in Allegheny,415 the secondary sidewalk in Van 
Orden,416 the small city park in Pleasant Grove City,417 or the remote desert corner of a 
national park in Buono .418 Location is not dispositive of the Establishment Clause 
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question, as litigants in Pinette found out; in that case, religious activities and displays 
on the plaza of the state capitol were upheld.419 But location is a factor in some cases. 
And location can play a key role if it strongly influences whether citizens are actually or 
effectively forced to observe or participate in the religious exercise. That smacks of 
coercion and leads the Court to find a violation of the establishment clause, as in 
Stone420 and various cases on prayer in public schools.421 
A fourth factor is whether the religious symbol or practice is offset by other 
secular symbols or practices. Particularly when government sponsors or houses 
religious symbols on its property, it is best to offset these religious symbols by non-
religious symbols of comparable size, weight, and genre. McCreary County makes clear 
that a court can (and sometimes will) second guess the government when the court 
suspects subterfuge.422 But lower courts have generally been sympathetic with 
government officials who try to balance religious and non-religious messages in their 
public display.423 In assessing the balance, they will make rough judgments whether the 
offsetting symbols’ messages are of comparable genre; whether its religious qualities 
are obvious or more abstract; and whether the religious symbol is suitable or unsuitable 
for the government forum.424 For example, a Renaissance “Madonna With Child” may 
be fine in the foyer of the state museum but not in the entrance to the state capitol. This, 
like all these rules of thumb, merely reiterates that context matters. 
Conclusion and Postscript 
The Salazar case and the Lautsi case were not inevitable in result given the 
shifting precedents available to the high courts of the United States and Europe 
respectively. And neither case is likely to end the perennially contensted questions of 
the Constitutional place of religious symbols on government land.  
At the time of this writing Salazar is back before the federal district court that now 
must judge the Constitutionality of Congress’s decision to sell the land.425 Since the 
Salazar case was remanded, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has just issued another 
opinion, striking down another old memorial cross that the city of San Diego sold to 
Congress in an effort to preserve it against an Establishment Clause challenge.426 
However the Salazar district court comes out on remand, the case will almost certainly 
be appealed again to the same Ninth Circuit court, and likely to the Supreme Court as 
well.. 
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Just as this Article was going to final press, the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights issued an important opinion that upheld Italy’s policy of 
displaying crucifixes in its public school classrooms, reversing the Chamber below in a 
15-2 decision. The Grand Chamber stated clearly that the crucifix is a religious symbol, 
that atheism is a protected religious belief, and that public schools must be religiously 
neutral.  But the Court held that the Italy’s longstanding policy of “passive displays” of a 
crucifix in each public school classroom was no violation of religious freedom – 
particularly when students of all faiths were welcome in public schools and were free to 
wear their own religious symbols.  The Court held further that Italy’s policy of displaying 
only the crucifix was no violation of religious neutrality, but an acceptable democratic 
reflection of its majoritarian Catholic culture.  With European nations widely divided on 
whether and where to display various religious symbols, the Court concluded, Italy must 
be granted a “margin of appreciation” to decide for itself how and where to maintain its 
Christian traditions in school. 
There is much more to be said about the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Lautsi.  
But what is notable here is how closely the Grand Chamber’s logic tracks that of the 
United States Supreme Court in its last three religious symbolism cases – Van Orden, 
Pleasant Grove, and Buono. While not entirely convergent in their religious symbolism 
cases, the American and European high courts now seem to hold six teachings in 
common.   
First, tradition counts in these cases.  In American courts, as we saw, older 
religious displays tend to fare better than newer displays.  The longstanding customary 
presence of a religious symbol in public life eventually renders it not only acceptable but 
indispensable to defining who we are as a people.  In Lautsi, Judge Bonello put this 
argument strongly in his concurrence: “A court of human rights cannot allow itself to 
suffer from historical Alzheimer's. It has no right to disregard the cultural continuum of a 
nation's flow through time, nor to ignore what, over the centuries, has served to mould 
and define the profile of a people.” 
Second, religious symbols often have redeeming cultural value.  American courts 
have long recognized that a Decalogue is not only a religious commandment but also a 
common moral code, that a cross is not only a Christian symbol, but also a poignant 
memorial to military sacrifice.  When passively and properly displayed, the meaning of a 
symbol can be left in the eye of the beholder – a sort of free market hermeneutic. The 
Lautsi court echoed this logic.  While recognizing the crucifix as religious in origin, the 
Court accepted Italy’s argument that “the crucifix also symbolized the principles and 
values” of liberty, equality, and fraternity which “formed the foundation of democracy” 
and human rights in Italy and well beyond.   
Third, local values deserve some deference.  In America, the doctrine of 
federalism requires federal courts to defer to the practices and policies of individual 
states, unless there are clear violations of federal constitutional rights to free exercise 
and no establishment of religion.  The Supreme Court has used this doctrine to uphold 
the passive display of crosses and Decalogues on state capitol grounds. The Lautsi 
Court uses the European “margin of appreciation” doctrine in much the same way.  
Lacking European consensus on public displays of religion and finding no coerced 
religious practice or indoctrination in this case, the Court left Italy to decide for itself how 
to balance the religious symbolism of its Catholic majority and the religious freedom and 
education rights of its atheistic minorities.   
Fourth, religious freedom does not require the secularization of society.  The 
United States Supreme Court became famous for its image of a “high and impregnable 
wall of separation between church and state,” that left religion hermetically sealed from 
political life and public institutions and heremeneutically sealed from political and legal 
arguments. But the reality today is that the Court has abandoned much of its strict 
separatism and now allows religious and non-religious parties alike to engage in 
peaceable public activities, even in public schools. The European Court of Human 
Rights likewise became famous for promoting French-style laïcité in public schools and 
public life, striking down Muslim headscarves and other religious symbols as contrary to 
the democratic “message of tolerance, respect for others, and equality and non-
discrimination.” Lautsi suggests a new policy that respects the rights of private religious 
and secular groups alike to express their views, but allows government to reflect 
democratically the traditional religious views of its majority.  
Fifth, religious freedom does not give a minority a heckler’s veto over majoritarian 
policies.  Until recently, American courts allowed taxpayers to challenge any law 
touching religion even if it caused them no real personal injury. This effectively gave 
secularists a “veto” over sundry laws and policies on religion -- however old, common, 
or popular those laws might be.  The Supreme Court has now tightened its standing 
rules considerably, forcing parties to make many of their cases for legal reform in the 
legislatures and to seek individual exemptions from policies that violate their beliefs.  
Lautsi holds similarly.  It recognizes that while the crucifix may cause offense to Ms. 
Lautsi, it represents the cherished cultural values of millions of others, who in turn are 
offended by her views. But personal offense cannot be a ground for censorship.  
Freedom of religion and expression requires that all views be heard in public life. 
Finally, religious symbolism cases are serious business.  As we said in the 
Introduction, it’s easy to be cynical about these cases. But the high temperature of the 
litigation and the close focus of the international media on these cases suggests that 
these cases about religious symbols are themselves symbolically important for a 
democratic culture. These cases are essential forums to work out peaceably deep 
cultural differences and to find ways of accommodating both traditions and the shifting 
needs of modern cultures. 
